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ABSTRACT 
 
As the call for greenhouse gas mitigation becomes more and more urgent, both in the United States and in 
many other countries, landfill owners are encouraged to contribute to emission reduction by developing 
Landfill Gas-to-Energy (LFGE) projects. Since the first LFGE electricity generation project in 1982 and 
with the increased support for renewable sources of energy, LFGE projects have increased in number. 
This study examines the influence of state policies, including state grants, production tax credits, 
investment tax credits, and Renewable Portfolio Standards, on landfill owners’ and developers’ decisions 
to build LFGE projects. This question is addressed using econometric models such as linear probability 
models and various logit models. 
The four policy variables are shown to have no significant effect on LFGE project adoption according to 
the logit estimations. Variables such as the gas price, public ownership, landfill age, and amount of waste 
are shown to have a significant effect on increasing project adoption. The linear probability model, 
despite its flaws in addressing the issue, produces positive and significant results for the effects of the 
RPS and state grant policies on project adoption. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As the call for greenhouse gas mitigation becomes more and more urgent, both in the United 
States and in many other countries, landfill owners are encouraged to contribute to emission 
reduction by developing Landfill Gas-to-Energy (LFGE) projects. Compared to other renewable 
energy sources, LFGE projects are relatively small in generation capacity, but their potential as a 
renewable energy has induced various forms of government support and the idea of converting 
waste into energy has won public attention. Since the first LFGE electricity generation project in 
1982 and with the increased support for renewable sources of energy, LFGE projects have 
increased in number. 
According to reports by the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), methane is currently 
the second most important greenhouse gas and was responsible for 15% of the change in 
radiative forcing from 1980 to 1990.1 In the United States, Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) 
landfills are the third-largest source of human-made methane emissions, and were responsible for 
17% of the methane emissions in 2009.2 
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Figure 1.1. U.S. Methane Emissions by Source 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
The gas generated and emitted from a landfill contains a large amount of methane - a very 
powerful greenhouse gas. An LFGE project collects the Landfill Gas (LFG) that would otherwise 
have been released to the atmosphere, and uses it to generate heat or power. When landfill gas is 
burned, the methane is converted to carbon dioxide, which has a significantly smaller warming 
effect.3 Additionally, the generated heat or power defers the need to burn other types of fuels 
such as coal or oil. Because of its environmental effects and because landfilling is an inevitable 
consequence of human activity, LFG is considered a renewable energy. Further, the sale of LFG 
creates revenue for LFGE developers, but the costs and benefits of a project differ widely for 
each landfill. Nonetheless, the sale of LFG may be a potential source of additional net revenue 
for some landfill owners. The environmental and economic benefits of LFGE projects have made 
them a viable option for local governments and businesses to take responsibility as well as secure 
３ 
 
a source of energy and revenue. 
This study investigated the effects of the state Renewable Portfolio Standards and other financial 
incentives on the decision of landfill owners to adopt landfill gas-to-energy projects. These 
effects are estimated from carefully specified econometric models. Several model specifications 
and estimating methods are used, and the performances of the models are compared. 
 
1.1 Background 
 There are about 2,400 currently operating or recently closed landfills in the United States. 
Among these landfills, there were 560 operating LFGE projects in 2010, 410 of which were 
electricity generation and 150 of which were direct-use applications (Table 1). The total electric 
generation capacity was over 1,700 mW and collectively these landfills produced about 300 
million standard cubic feet of LFG per day (mmscfd) in direct-use applications.4 
Table 1. Breakdown of Landfill Gas Energy Projects in 2010 
Landfill Gas Energy Use Number of Projects 
Electric 
      Reciprocating Engines 313 
     Gas Turbines 31 
     Other 66 
     All Electric 410 
Direct 
      Boilers 59 
     Direct Thermal & Leachate 
          Evaporation 57 
     Other 34 
     All Direct 150 
４ 
 
Total 560 
All Landfills 2399 
Source: US EPA Landfill Methane Outreach Program 
 
LFGE projects have become increasingly popular in recent years due to a host of contributing 
factors such as increasing energy costs, policies and regulations to promote renewable energy, 
and technology improvement. The number of operating projects increased from 113 to 560 
during 1991-2010 (Figure 1.1). The largest increase, 46 new projects was observed during 1997-
1998 period, possibly due to the expiration at the end of 1998 of Section 29 tax credit for non-
conventional gas production.5 
 
Figure 1.2. Total Number of Operating LFGE Projects 1991- 2010 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Time Trend of Cumulative LFGE  
Electricity Generating Capacity (mW) 
 
Figure 1.4. Time Trend of Cumulative Direct 
Use Applications (mmscfd) 
Source: US EPA Landfill Methane Outreach Program 
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There are three kinds of LFGE projects depending on how the LFG is used. An electricity 
generation project uses various technologies such as engines, turbines, micro turbines, and fuel 
cells, to generate electricity from LFG. This power is used on-site or is transmitted through the 
power grid and sold to consumers. A direct use project uses the LFG to heat boilers, kilns, 
greenhouses or other thermal applications. Finally, a cogeneration plant uses LFG for its thermal 
energy and electricity generations. The cogeneration plant is especially attractive because of its 
efficiency. Out of the 560 LFGE projects presently operating, two thirds are electricity 
generation projects, one third is direct use, and a small proportion is cogeneration plants.6 
 
1.2 Basic Concepts 
1.2.1 The Science of Landfill Gas to Energy Projects 
Landfill gas is composed of methane, carbon dioxide, and non-methanogenic organic compounds. 
Methane is considered the second most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas and the waste in 
landfills is the single largest human-made source of methane in the United States. (Chen and 
Greene, 2003) Other than its methane content, LFG is hazardous because it can cause explosion 
when accumulated in enclosed spaces. In addition, LFG may contain small amounts of ozone-
forming volatile organic compounds (VOC’s) and toxic or carcinogenic hazardous air pollutants 
(HAP’s).  
Landfill gas is generated from a chain of physical, chemical, and microbial (bacterial activities) 
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processes that occur in the waste – the most important of the processes being the anaerobic 
decomposition of organic waste. The process happens for a total of 10 to 80+ years. Appreciable 
amounts of LFG are produced within 1-3 years of waste placement, peaking at 5-7 years after.7 
For the purpose of this study, it is important to examine the conditions at which the anaerobic 
decomposition of organic matters is most active. Because the gas is generated from the 
decomposition of organic matter, the amount of organic matter is most important. Also, the 
anaerobic state must be achieved, which can be affected by the cover of the landfill. Compact 
waste and large waste particles can inhibit moisture and nutrient transport, decreasing microbial 
activity. Warmer temperatures and sufficient moisture content assists microbial activity. Further, 
waste with a lower pH (acidic waste) and waste with low nutrient content tend to generate gas 
slowly.8 9 
 
1.2.2 Landfill gas recovery and utilization technology 
In order to use LFG to generate energy, the gas must first be collected from the waste. The gas is 
extracted by gas extraction wells distributed throughout the landfill waste. The gas extraction 
wells are connected to a gas collection pipe, which directs the collected gas to a central point 
where the gas will be processed and treated according to the ultimate use of the gas. Figure 1.4 
below shows a simple diagram of an LFG extraction and collection system. 
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Figure 1.5. Diagram of Landfill Gas Extraction Well 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Diagram of an LFG collection system 
Source: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
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LFG can be used directly as gas or can be used indirectly as fuel to generate electricity.  
Electricity Generation 
Two-thirds of the LFGE projects in the United States are electricity generation plants. The 
electricity is generated by fueling internal combustion engines, turbines, micro turbines, and fuel 
cells. Most of the electricity generation projects use internal combustion engines, but 
microturbines are often chosen at smaller landfills. Internal combustion engine capacity ranges 
from 100kW to 3mW, turbines have capacities from 800kW to 10.3mW, and micro turbines 
range from 30kW to 250kW.10 
Direct Use 
LFG can also be used directly in place of other fuel, such as natural gas, coal, and fuel oil. The 
gas can be used in thermal applications, including boilers, greenhouses, etc. Examples of 
industries that directly use LFG range as wide as manufacturing, wastewater treatment, chemical 
production, consumer electronics, prisons and hospitals.11 
Cogeneration 
Cogeneration, also called combined heat and power, projects use LFG to generate both electricity 
and thermal energy. These projects capture the heat in addition to generating electricity, making 
them especially efficient.12 
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1.2.3 Economics of LFGE project 
The economic feasibility of an LFGE project can be determined by examining the cost and 
revenues of a project. An LFGE project involves construction and installation costs (i.e. capital 
costs), and operation and maintenance costs. Some of these costs can be mitigated by grants, 
low-interest loans, investment tax credits, and sales tax exemptions. The main revenues of an 
LFGE project would be derived from the sales of electricity and gas, and thus would depend on 
the electricity and gas prices. These electricity or gas price might include a premium in the case 
that demand exceeds supply that may result from renewable portfolio standards or green power 
purchase initiatives. In addition to the energy sales revenue, the project owner may be able to sell 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) or receive production incentives or production tax credits for 
every unit of energy sold. 
Costs of LFGE projects 
The capital cost of constructing an LFGE project depend on a myriad of factors including 
methane production, size of landfill, type of engine, total generation capacity, distance to power 
grid, etc. The landfill owner or developer will determine the project capacity considering all 
these factors.  
According to a study done in 2005 by Jaramillo and Matthews, the costs of a collection and flare 
system range from $628,000 to $3,599,000 for landfills that have daily gas flows of 642,000 
cf/day and 5,266,000 cf/day. The capital cost of installing an internal combustion engine ranges 
from $151,500 for a 100 kW engine to $4,595,000 for a 5 mW engine. A paper by Morgan and 
Yang (2001) conducted economic feasibility studies on three St. Louis landfills. The paper 
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provided the estimated total capital and operation costs of these landfills, assuming that the most 
profitable capacity is chosen. The West County landfill had 6,000,000 tons of waste in 1999, and 
West Lake landfill had 10,615,857 tons of waste. The capital cost of building a 7.8 mW project at 
West County landfill was estimated to be $8.4 million for a facility and a 13.4 mW project was 
estimated to cost $14.6 million at West Lake landfill. The annual operation and maintenance 
costs were estimated at $1.9 million for West County and $3.2 million for West Lake. It should 
be noted, however, that the capacities selected for these case studies are at the higher end; 
typically, LFGE projects have smaller capacities and thus require smaller capital costs. 
According to a report by the Natural Resource Defense Council (2003), a typical landfill costs 
$ 1.5 million. Also, the report provides a comparison of cost and benefits, as shown in figure 1.7. 
For smaller landfills or landfills with less methane production, the cost per kWh of electricity is 
about 7.5 cents. Even the larger landfills have a cost of 5.5 cents per kWh. However, with the 
New Source Performance standard, the gas-collection system is mandatory for some landfills, 
making the cost for installing gas-collection facility a sunk cost. Excluding the gas-collection 
system cost, the cost of generating a kWh of electricity ranges from 4 to 5 cents. The wholesale 
electricity price at the time the report was written was around 2.5 to 3 cents, making an LFGE 
project unfeasible. For the landfills that benefited from the section 29 tax credit, the project is 
more likely to breakeven. Considering these cost and benefit figures it is clear that financial 
incentives are essential to many landfill gas-to-energy projects. 
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Figure 1.7. Landfill-Gas Energy Production Costs Vs. Electricity Sales Revenue 
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council 
 
Revenue of LFGE Projects 
The major source of revenue for a project owner is the revenue from the sales of electricity or 
gas. Electricity can be sold to a utility or transferred directly to an end-user. The revenue in the 
first case would be the wholesale electricity price. In the second case, if the power is used on-site, 
the revenue is the retail electricity price, but if the power is used by a second party, the revenue 
would be the pre-set energy price. The same applies to direct use project – the price is 
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determined by to whom the gas is sold. 
The major complication with power and gas prices is that a decision to build the project must be 
based on the expected prices of electricity or gas, in the future period when the commodity 
would be sold. Since an LFGE project is typically operated for about 15 years, the decision turns 
in part on an accurate forecast of revenue that would be discounted appropriately over the 15 
years after a project is open. However, it is difficult to attain the data on expected energy price. 
As an alternative, lagged price can be used, because price expectation is often based on the 
current price at the time the decision is made. Because the decision to embark on a project would 
be made approximately 1-2 years before the project is open, the electricity price a year prior to 
the project open date would be influence the decision to build a project. Also, assuming that price 
expectations are rational, and thus accurate (Fair, 1989), an average of the lagged, present, and 
future prices can be used as a proxy. In the present study, the average energy price of 3 years (the 
previous, present, and next year) was used to represent the expected price. 
There are two factors about energy sales that would be important to the project owner. The first 
is the price premium that could result from a scarcity in renewable energy. For instance, if a state 
requires utilities to generate or purchase a certain portion of their electricity from renewable 
sources, and thus, the demand becomes larger than the supply, utilities will offer prices higher 
than the wholesale energy market price to renewable energy generators. The Renewable Portfolio 
Standard is a regulation that requires utilities to acquire a certain amount of their energy supply 
from renewable sources. Green power purchase programs are another policy measure that 
requires certain, mostly public, organizations to purchase a portion of their electricity from 
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renewable sources.  
Government Regulations and Incentives 
Another factor that contributes to cost recovery is the availability of contracts to sell the energy 
for a given period of time. If a project owner is able to enter into a contract with a utility or other 
buyer, he/she is guaranteed a stable source of revenue for a period of time, which decreases risk. 
A good example of such a contract is the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Generation Partners 
Program. TVA bases the standard offer on a seasonal time-of-day averages chart, which sets base 
prices for the term of the contract. These prices increase at a rate of 3% per year and may be 
changed with 90 days’ notice by TVA (but the change can be no more than 1% per year). The 
contract periods are 10, 15, or 20 years.13 Policies such as renewables portfolio standards are the 
main reason that utilities offer such contracts. Utilities secure sources of renewable energy in 
expectation of future regulations. 
Renewable Energy Credits (REC’s) are another form of price premium that renewable energy 
generators can receive. When a firm generates renewable energy, they can receive RECs, and 
these RECs are certified by a certifying authority. The REC’s can be bundled with the energy and 
sold as a package, or they can be sold separately. Utilities, non-profits, and other environmental 
organizations buy RECs.14 REC’s can be purchased by utilities in lieu of purchasing renewable 
electricity, to meet RPS requirements. However, only a handful of states have a significant 
compliance REC (REC’s traded as a means to comply to RPS requirements) prices, and the 
voluntary REC prices have dropped to low levels.15 The higher REC prices, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine, range around $40-$60 per mWh (￠0.6 per 
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kWh), which is a significant amount. But, many other states have REC prices close to zero. 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Compliance REC prices, January 2008 to June 2012 
Sources: Spectron Group<http://www.spectrongroup.com/> (2012) 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Production incentives and production tax credits can be an additional source of revenue. These 
two policies add to the energy price received by the LFGE project owner, because the incentives 
are given for every unit of energy produced. The Section 29 tax credit was an important Federal 
production tax incentive given to LFGE project owners. According to this policy, projects placed 
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in service after Dec 31, 1992 and prior to June 30, 1998, can claim tax credit of $0.01/kWh 
through year 2007.16 This policy is known to have encouraged many landfills to adopt LFGE 
projects. (Chen and Greene, 2003) Some states also offer a similar type of production tax credit 
policy. Production incentives are similar to production tax credits, except that the incentive is 
given as money rather than tax credits. 
Because many renewable energy projects are capital intensive, policies that mitigate the cost 
burden are also important. Investment tax credits and grants partially alleviate the financial 
burden of building a renewable energy facility. Investment tax credits (ITC) are given to eligible 
facilities as a pre-determined percentage of the construction and installation costs. Grants work 
in a similar way, and the percentage of the cost that is covered is different for each policy. ITC’s 
are often offered at the state level, and grants are offered by state and city governments, as well 
as by private utilities. 
An important regulation concerning landfill gas emissions is the New Source Performance 
Standard, which requires newer landfill facilities with large design capacities to install a gas 
collection and control system. The owners of these large landfills had a choice between flaring 
the collected gas and using it in a gas-to-energy facility. This regulation further lowers the cost of 
building an LFGE project for larger landfill owners, because they would no longer consider the 
cost for a collection system as part of the LFGE project cost. This would mean that the amount of 
waste is doubly important, first because it approximates the amount of organic matter, and 
second because larger landfills are obligated to install a collection system regardless of whether 
the owner wants to pursue a gas-to-energy project, bringing down the cost of project installation. 
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In the next chapter, I will present a review of studies and reports that lend insight into the factors 
that affect LFGE projects as well as investigate the effectiveness of RPS policy. Chapter 3 
introduces variables – landfill characteristics, energy prices, financial incentives – that were 
included in the study as contributing factors to LFGE project development along with data 
explanation. Chapter 4 provides the econometric models used to estimate the effects of each 
policy on project adoption. In chapter 5, I present and discuss the results of the econometric 
estimations. Based on these results, the simulated effects of each policy are also presented. 
Chapter 6 concludes the findings of the study and discusses the limits and possible improvements 
of the study. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The empirical literature on the effect of RPS on Landfill Gas-to-Energy projects is not extensive. 
Accordingly, after a review of an empirical study similar to the present paper, I expanded the 
literature review to include a general report on LFGE projects, feasibility studies of LFGE 
projects, reports on the effect of RPS on the overall renewable energy industry, and papers that 
examine the driving force behind other renewables, namely, wind energy. 
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An empirical study similar to that of the present present paper was done by Katherine Delhotal 
(2007). In her study, she assesses the effect of renewable portfolio standards on the diffusion of 
Landfill gas-to-energy technology in the United States. The paper uses landfill data and 
renewables policy data from the LMOP database and DSIRE, respectively. However, Delhotal 
chooses a survival analysis model to assess the rate of diffusion of the LFGE technology. This 
particular model was chosen because the author believes that cost recovery and profitability are 
not the only factors of technology adoption. Instead, technology adoption has much to do with 
the information available to the adopter; not all adopters have the same information. As the 
technology is adopted by more firms, the information is spread and adoption rate will increase. 
Such a focus on adoption rate makes survival analysis appropriate, because the survival model 
assumes that adopters will adopt at different paces due to the difference in information. However, 
in order for a survival model to work, all adopters must have the same preference for the 
technology and face the same costs at all time periods. For this reason, the paper limited its 
estimation to ‘candidate’ landfills from the LMOP database. Candidate landfills are those that 
could build a profitable LFGE project, considering the cost and benefits associated with building 
the project. 
The results of the analysis show that RPS, net metering, methane potential, private ownership 
and electricity prices are significant in increasing the probability of LFGE technology adoption. 
This result is consistent with the theory. Interconnection standards and oil price, however, do not 
turn out to be significant factors in technology diffusion. The financial incentives, including PTC, 
ITC, grants, and tax exemptions were estimated to be effective at the 90% significance level. 
Because of the similarity in data form and model specification, the results of this study lend 
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particularly important insights into the model specifications for the work in this thesis.  
 
A report by Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (Chen and Greene, 2003) gives an 
overview of the types of federal and state level incentives that might influence the opening of a 
landfill gas to energy project. One federal incentive is the renewable energy production incentive 
which gives approximately 1.5 cents per kWh of renewable energy produced. However, this 
policy designates LFGE as a tier2 source of energy and thus the incentive allotted to landfill 
projects fluctuates annually. Another federal incentive is the section 29 tax credit, which 
subsidizes LFG collection facilities about 1 cent per kWh. This tax incentive proved to be quite 
effective considering the spike in LFGE projects after its implementation. At the state and local 
level, California gives an incentive of 1.13 cents per kwh and Illinois has a generous grant for 
LFGE projects. At the retail level, green power programs sell renewable energy to consumers 
who are willing to pay a premium. Also, most states have adopted the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard to encourage renewable energy generation. The report states that the RPS does not 
provide as large an incentive as the green power programs. It is helpful to note that the report 
was written in 2003 when RPS was relatively new.  
 
A feasibility study (Morgan and Yang 2001) was conducted on four St. Louis, Missouri landfills, 
to determine the breakeven price that would make a Landfill Gas-to-Energy profitable. The result 
of the study was that the four landfills would profit from an LFGE project if the electricity is sold 
at around 4 cents per kilowatt-hour. This estimate is higher than the avoided cost provided by 
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utilities at the time of the study, implying that additional revenue, such as government subsidy, is 
necessary to make the projects feasible. The paper used E-PLUS (Energy Project Landfill Gas 
Utilization Software), a program provided by the USEPA to estimate the cost of building and 
operating an LFGE project. The factors that determine the costs include landfill age, landfill 
depth, total waste in place, and annual rate at which waste is accepted. Financial factors such as 
loan rate and project type is also important in determining the financial performance of a project. 
It is should also be noted that the landfills used in the study are on the larger side in landfill size, 
ranging from 6 to 13 million tons of waste, thus the results might not be as favorable for smaller-
size landfills. 
Jaramillo and Matthews (2005) conducted a feasibility analysis on the same St. Louis landfills. 
This study did not use the EPLUS program, but conducted its own cost analysis. The results of 
this study yield a lower breakeven point, even though the methane production was estimated to 
be lower. It is somewhere between 3 cents to 4 cents per kWh, compared to 4 cents in Morgan 
and Yang’s paper. This is suggested to be because the analysis assumed larger generation 
capacities compared to those assigned by the EPLUS software used in Morgan and Yang. The 
three main parts of the cost analysis is the collection system, engine system, and flaring costs. 
The collection system and engine both show economies of scale, meaning the larger the 
collection system and larger the engine capacity, the more economically efficient is the cost of 
installing and operating the facility. A further analysis of the paper is the net social benefit of a 
LFGE project calculated by avoided methane emissions and emission offsets. If benefits from 
emission offsets are included, the break-even price of electricity decreases to less than 2 cents 
per kWh. The emission benefits are the largest benefits. This suggests that government subsidies 
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on LFGE projects may be a justifiable considering the social benefit of reduced emissions. 
Another point made in the paper is that IC engines lead to the highest private net present value 
(NPV) but gas turbines lead to the highest social NPV because they create less emission. 
 
Some ex-ante studies have been conducted on the effect of RPS on renewable energy generation. 
There is a report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) on the effect of a 10 percent 
RPS scenario. The study assumes a scenario where the RPS starts at the rate of 2.5% of retail 
electricity sales in 2005 and gradually reaches 10% by 2020. Using the Electricity Market Model 
which consists of modules for the demand, supply and conversion of energy, the study predicts 
that the 10% RPS case will increase electricity generation by landfill gas by 25% in 2005 
compared to a reference scenario in the absence of RPS. In 2010 this figure is predicted to be 25% 
and in 2020 16%. The main factors that drive the amount of renewable energy generation are the 
cost of the renewable technology, the cost to continue generation in existing plants, and the 
consumers’ willingness to pay. 
Both Lyon and Yin (2009) and National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Cory and Swezey, 2007) 
suggest that the market structure for electricity buyers and sellers can influence renewable energy 
generation under RPS. The market could consist of a single electricity provider or it could be 
restructured to allow competition. The NREL report predicts that the former case would provide 
a more stable environment to make investment in renewable energy generation, but suggests that 
this effect is ambiguous when specific cases are studied. Lyon and Yin (2009) find that a state 
with a restructured market has a higher probability of RPS adoption. According to the NREL, the 
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two kinds of risk involved in financing a renewable energy project are investment risk and 
revenue risk. The tax incentives that reduce overall costs reduce the investment risk and long-
term purchasing contracts decreases the revenue risk. It was shown that states that require 
utilities to sign long-term purchasing contracts with renewable energy generators have better 
results in renewable development.  
A report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Wiser and Barbose 2008) predicts that 
RPS will induce sizable renewable energy development. As an indicator, more than 50% of the 
newly added renewable energy capacity from 1998 through 2007 occurred in states with active, 
mandatory RPS policies. The figure rises to 60% in 2002 and reached 76% in 2007. However, it 
is also mentioned that the RPS policy is likely to be enacted in states that have higher renewable 
energy potential. In 2007, wind power was the sector most supported by the RPS requirement, 
but many states plan to support specific renewables that at the time had higher costs but were 
nonetheless promising, especially solar power. This specific support is given through credit 
multipliers and some states, including Massachusetts and Washington DC, apply credit 
multipliers to methane. 
Lyon and Yin (2009) investigate the factors that determine whether or not a state adopts the RPS. 
The paper uses a logit model to test whether factors such as existing renewable energy potential, 
the share of natural gas in the electricity fuel mix, and democratic presence in state legislature 
affect the decision to adopt RPS among various other factors. The findings are that strong 
existing renewable energy potential, a small share of natural gas in the electricity market, and 
organized renewable energy interest contribute to the adoption of RPS. These factors are 
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important to consider when using RPS as an independent variable of a model, because the study 
suggests that existing landfill to energy projects could affect RPS resulting in potential 
simultaneity. 
 
Because of the scarcity of literature on the impacts of landfill gas-to-energy projects, several 
papers on wind energy were also examined to acquire insight into on the impacts of government 
policy on building renewable energy projects. The first paper is a report by the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) (Bird and Parsons 2003) that examines the factors at play 
in the states that have substantial wind energy investment. The main drivers of wind energy 
development include renewable portfolio standards, favorable market conditions, system benefits 
funds, settlement agreements with large power plants, property tax exemption, sales tax 
exemption, and green power markets. The California restructuring debacle in 2000 and 2001 
drove up energy prices, making market conditions favorable for wind energy developers in its 
neighboring states, namely Oregon and Washington. System benefits funds are collected by 
charging utilities a designated amount for every unit of electricity sold. In many cases, this fund 
is given to renewable energy projects in the form of production incentives. An example of a 
settlement agreement that benefited wind energy is the one in Minnesota where Xcel energy was 
required to develop or purchase 825 mW of wind power in exchange for the right to store nuclear 
waste. A renewable energy project may be exempt from property taxes. Renewable energy 
generating equipment may also be is exempt from sales taxes as another way to support their 
development. In some states utilities are obliged to supply a green power option to its customers, 
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and in some cases, the market is formed voluntarily. 
For the purpose of the present study, factors such as settlement agreements and system benefits 
funds are difficult to quantify, because they are a one-time occurrence and the dispersion of 
benefits is not systematic. Market conditions are mainly represented by electricity prices, which 
can be easily quantified. Also, renewable portfolio standards, property and sales tax exemptions, 
and green power markets can all be predicted to affect landfill gas energy in a manner to how 
they affect wind energy projects. 
 
Another report published by NREL (Short, Blair, and Heimiller 2004) uses a projection model – 
WinDS – to estimate the impact of policy initiatives on the expansion of wind energy capacity. 
The paper examines the impact of three types of policies – R&D investment, production tax 
credits, and RPSs - on the expansion of wind energy capacity. The R&D has a significant effect – 
it is estimated that only 30% of wind energy capacity would occur if R&D in wind is 
discontinued. The production tax credit (PTC) does not have an effect in the long run, but it will 
speed up wind energy development. This is because a PTC would eventually end and will only 
encourage faster development in regions favorable to wind farms, but would not improve 
prospects for regions that have poor wind resources. The RPS is also projected to have a 
significant effect on the expansion of wind capacity, especially if there is a significant penalty for 
non-compliance. In 2025, an RPS with an $ 18/mWh penalty it is estimated that there will be an 
increase in the total wind energy capacity by more than 60%.  
 
２４ 
 
Chapter 3: Independent Variables and Data Explanation 
 
This study uses three separate econometric models to estimate the effects of the RPS and other 
financial incentives on LFGE project decision. The three models are the linear probability model, 
logit model, and a mixed logit model that incorporates random effects. Before discussing these 
models in greater detail, we describe the data used in the estimation. Much of this discussion 
focuses on the construction of a number of explanatory variables to explain the probability of 
LFGE project adoption.  
 
The study uses a panel of individual landfills over a period of 20 years. The data includes landfill 
characteristics variables, weather variables, and economic variables. The landfill characteristics 
data, which include landfill age, waste in place, landfill owner, distance to power grid, and LFGE 
project variable, are individual-level data. The temperature and precipitation data are averaged 
county-level data. The economic and policy variables – electricity and gas price, state RPS, state 
grant, production tax credit, investment tax credit, power purchase agreement – are state-level 
data. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) 
provides a database for about 2400 landfills in the United States. These data includes the date at 
which the landfill was open, waste in place, landfill owner, and landfill location (state, city, 
county), whether there is an operational LFGE project, and if there is - project type, project 
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capacity, and project developer. The EPA also provided longitude and latitude data for each 
landfill. 
 
We proceed with a discussion of how each of the variables is defined and how they relate to a 
theory for the adoption of an LFGE project. 
 
3.1.1 Landfill Characteristics 
Factors related to methane potential 
The methane production potential of a landfill is an important determinant of the economic 
feasibility of an LFGE project because, as with many other production firms, an LFGE system 
has economies of scale. (see Jaramillo and Matthews 2005) This means that a larger amount of 
methane production would make an LFGE project more economically efficient. LFG is produced 
by the anaerobic decomposition of organic waste. Consequently, LFG production can be 
simplified into a function of the size and age of the waste volume, waste type, moisture content, 
and temperature (Rajaram, Siddiqui, and Kahn 2011). In this study, I was able to incorporate four 
of these factors: size of the waste volume (waste in place), age of the waste, moisture content, 
and temperature. 
Waste in Place 
Because the methane in LFG is produced by the anaerobic decomposition of organic waste, it is 
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important to know the amount of organic matter in the waste. This would involve knowledge of 
the exact proportions of various waste products in the waste, or at least the proportions of waste 
type – such as industrial/commercial/institutional waste and residential waste. If the waste 
content is known, one can use this information to derive the organic content of the waste. 
However, because waste content information is impossible to attain, we will use the total waste 
in place as a proxy for organic content.   
The data are provided in the USEPA LMOP database. The waste in place ranges from 700 to 
120,000,000 tons with an average of 4,997,673 tons. Because of the large values, this variable is 
scaled by its mean. 
Landfill Age 
The LFG gene ration at a landfill happens in several phases, each of which takes different 
periods of time. Methane generation typically starts 1 to 3 years after the waste is dumped in the 
landfill and peaks at 5 – 7 years. Almost all gas is produced within 20 years after the waste is 
dumped, although small amounts of methane can be produced after this period.17 Figure 3.1 
represents an example of how to characterize the methane production of a landfill. It is useful to 
note that a landfill often accepts waste for 20 – to 30 – years; which means significant amounts 
of methane would be produced for 30 – to 40 – years. 
The data are also provided in the USEPA LMOP database. The landfill age covered by the data 
panel used in this study ranges from 1 to 99 years, with an average of 24 years. 
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Figure 3.1 LFG generation curves  
Source: From landfill gas to energy technologies and challenges. 2012. 
 
Moisture Content 
Moisture in the waste increases the production of gas because the water encourages bacteria 
growth and spreads nutrients and bacteria to wide areas of the landfill. Although the moisture 
content of a landfill is determined by various factors, including type of landfill cover, condition 
of cover, temperature and precipitation, type of leachate collection system, etc18, we use 
precipitation as an estimate for moisture content. 
The precipitation data are the average precipitation at the county level from year 1999 to 2005. 
Precipitation ranges from 8,275 to 262,653 with an average of 104,954. These data are obtained 
from the authors of the paper - Creating County-Level Estimates from National Weather Service 
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Data. 
Temperature 
Warmer temperatures also cause more bacterial activity, which increases the rate of landfill gas 
production. There is a sharp decrease in bacterial activity below 50° Fahrenheit. The 
temperature data was also incorporated into the model. 
The data are also the average temperature at the county level from year 1999 to 2005. 
Temperature data ranges from 49.7 to 88.3, with an average of 69 degrees Fahrenheit. It was 
provided by the authors of the paper- Creating County-Level Estimates from National Weather 
Service Data.  
 
Other Landfill Characteristics 
Public Ownership 
In order to gain insight into other real factors that affect LFGE project decisions, interviews were 
conducted with several landfill owners and developers, and there was a distinct difference 
between private landfill developers and public landfill owners. The major motivation for private 
LFGE developers was the profitability of the project, including tax credits and electricity prices. 
On the other hand, managers of public landfills adopt waste-to-energy projects as a public 
service. Publicly owned and operated LFGE projects are often built to provide energy to a public 
facility such as a local prison or a waste water management facility. Although profitability is 
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important to public landfill managers, their decision to start a project seems to be affected by the 
public’s environmental concerns and feel-good factors as well as profitability. For this reason, 
the private or public ownership of a landfill may affect the probability that a project is built at the 
site, although it is ambiguous as to what direction the effect would be. That is, a private landfill 
owner might be more enthusiastic to create extra profit by building a project. On the contrary, 
public landfill managers might have better access to funds and would feel less of the risk in 
developing a project. 
Out of the 2,854 landfills included in the LMOP database, there are 1,618 public landfills. The 
variable is either 0 or 1 with a mean of 0.5878. 
Distance to Nearest Power Grid 
Although the cost of installing a transmission line does not comprise a large portion of the 
project capital cost (approximately 5%), the costs vary a great deal depending on the distance to 
the nearest power grid, making it an important factor in project decisions.19 According to the 
NRDC report (Chen and Greene, 2003), the cost of interconnection can vary from $20,000 to 
$500,000.  
The data on distance to nearest power grid data were obtained from NREL. These data indicate 
the straight line distance from a landfill to the nearest transmission line. The transmission line 
recorded in the NREL database goes down to 13kV, but some transmission lines with a capacity 
below 100kV can possibly be missing in the database. The distance ranges from 0.00075 km to 
89.6 km, with an average of 2.6 km. 
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3.1.2 Energy Prices 
The electricity and gas price data were obtained from the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA). The electricity price data is the average retail electricity price to ultimate customers, 
averaged by state and year. The values are converted to real prices using 1991 as the base year. 
The values are in cents per Kilowatt-hour. The variable ranges from 3.4 ¢/kWh to 12.1 ¢/kWh, 
with an average of 6.21 ¢/kWh. The natural gas price data are the annual average city-gate 
natural gas price by state and year, provided by the EIA. The citygate is a point or measuring 
station at which a distributing gas utility receives gas from a natural gas pipeline company or 
transmission system. These data are real prices with the base year 1991 and are in dollars per 
Thousand Cubic Feet. The variable ranges from $1.67 to $7.81, with an average of $4.07.  
 
3.1.3 Financial Incentives 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
The renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a regulation that requires utility companies to supply a 
designated portion of their electricity from renewable energy generation such as wind, solar, 
biomass, or other alternatives to fossil and nuclear electric generation. Each state has an RPS 
policy that specifies the eligible types of renewable energy sources as well as the utilities that 
must abide by the standard.20 The first RPS was enacted in 1983 by Iowa and an increasing 
number of states have adopted their own variation of this type of policy. As in figure 3.2, the 
number of states that mandate an RPS that includes landfill gas as an eligible energy source, 
３１ 
 
increased dramatically in the late 2000’s, peaking in 2012-2015 at 28 states. The target RPS level 
ranges from 2% in Iowa to 40% in Maine.  
For RPS information specific to landfill gas energy, Figure 3.3 is a graph that presents each 
state’s target RPS fraction that includes landfill gas as an eligible energy source in year 2012. 
The most common target RPS that includes landfill gas is around 20 percent. 
 
Figure 3.2 Time trend of the number of states that enforce an RPS 
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of target RPS levels 
DSIRE is a website that provides comprehensive information on federal, state, and local 
incentive and policies that aid renewable energy project development. The RPS data were 
obtained from this website, which gives the percentage of each state’s RPS, the implementation 
schedule, and the information on alternative compliance payment rates.  
Each state has different supplementary devices to the RPS policy. Some states have different 
types of renewable portfolio standards that are divided into Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary 
RPS’s. For example, Oregon requires a 25% RPS to larger utilities, 10% to smaller utilities, and 
5% to the smallest utilities, all targeted to be reached by 2025. Other states, such as North 
Carolina and Colorado, have different RPS standards for investor-owned utilities and municipal 
utilities.  
Most states have various tiers within their RPS. The tiers “refer to requirements that a specified 
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portion of the renewable energy obligation be met with certain resources or class of resources.” 
21 This is similar to the common solar set-aside, which mandates that a small portion of the 
overall RPS requirement be met specifically by solar energy sources. This ensures the states’ 
ability to promote specific energy projects that are deemed to have greater potential. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the RPS policy variable only considers the primary RPS and tiers 
that include landfill gas as an eligible energy source. In the example below (Table 3.1) of 
Colorado, landfill gas is included in all RPS types and all tiers. Since the study only considers 
primary RPS, the RPS policy variable for 2014 would be 0.12 (0.1075+0.0125). 
State 
(Notes and comments) 
RPS Type 
(Primary, etc.) 
Tier Target for 2014 
Colorado 1 1 0.1075 
1 2 0.0125 
2 1 0.03 
Table 3.1 Composition of RPS in the state of Colorado 
Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) 
The price premium for renewable energy is explicitly represented through Renewable Energy 
Certificates, also known as REC’s. A graph of REC prices in the market from 2002 to 2007 is 
presented in Figure 3.4. If a REC is priced $10/mWh, it would mean that a renewable electricity 
generator will earn 1 cent per KWh of electricity.  
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Figure 3.4 REC Prices in RPS Compliance Markets (Main Tier and Class I) 
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
 
Production Tax Credit (PTC) 
State production tax credits (PTC) are also included as an incentive that benefits LFGE project 
developers. The state PTC is tax credit given to a renewable energy generator for every kWh of 
electricity generated. Among the six states that provide PTC’s to LFGE project owners, the PTC 
rates range from 0.075¢/kWh (Nebraska) to 1.5¢/kWh (Iowa), with an average of 0.80¢/kWh. 
The earliest production tax credit policy was enacted in 2000 in Maryland, and by 2010 five 
other states had adopted the subsidy. Figure 3.5 shows the number of states that offer production 
tax credits each year. Because landfills owned by local government do not have to pay tax, this 
policy would not benefit municipal LFGE developers. 
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Figure 3.5 Time Trend of Number of States with Production Tax Credit 
 
In the panel, this variable has a non-zero value if in that time period, the state in which the 
landfill is located, has a production tax credit. The values for this variable are in cents per 
kilowatt-hour, and they are stated in each state’s PTC policy. The data was created in reference to 
policy data provided by DSIRE.  
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 
Investment tax credits (ITC) are granted to a taxpayer that installs a renewable energy facility, 
primarily as a percentage of the cost to construct the system. An LFGE project that generates 
electricity would benefit from this incentive. For the seven states that have an ITC policy, the 
ITC rate ranges from 10% (Kansas) to 100% (Kentucky) of the cost, with an average of 35%. 
The policy information was provided by DSIRE. In figure 3.7, the amount of ITC is presented 
according to the cost of the project and the stipulated ITC rate. According to the report by NRDC, 
the cost of building an LFGE project varies from $850,000 to $4,500,000, while a typical project 
costs $1,500,000 to build. This would mean that a typical landfill project that accepts an average 
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amount of ITC would still need to procure 1 million dollars of funds. Figure 3.7 presents the 
number of states that offer and ITC for each year. 
 
Figure 3.6 Time Trend of States with Investment Tax Credits 
 
In the panel, this variable has a non-zero value, if in that time period, the state, in which the 
landfill is located, has an investment tax credit. The values in this variable are the percentages of 
cost defined by each state policy. 
 
Table 3.2 Total Amount of ITC Depending on the Rate of ITC and Cost of LFGE Project 
 Rate of ITC 
Cost of 
LFGE 
Project 
 10% 35% 100% 
$850,000  $85,000  $297,500  $850,000  
$1,500,000  $150,000  $525,000  $1,500,000  
$4,500,000  $450,000  $1,575,000  $4,500,000  
Note: The figures for cost of LFGE project were taken from the NRDC report “Is landfill Gas Green Energy?” 
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State Grants 
Many states grant funds to applicants that submit proposals to develop renewable energy. The 
amounts of the grant and eligibility requirements differ for each grant program. For example, 
some of the state grants included in the DSIRE database are only for innovative technologies i.e. 
technology that has not been commercialized. (e.g. New Jersey’s REED program). Some of the 
grants that are included have size requirements, cost requirements, and are targeted to fund 
research by municipalities and public schools. Some grant programs require that the facility is 
located in the service territory of the state’s major utilities. Other programs require that a certain 
amount of power be used on site, in order for the project to qualify for state funding. Many 
programs require that the project generate electricity.  
 
Figure 3.7. Time Trend of Number of States with State Grant Program 
 
In the model for the present study, the state grant is included as a dummy variable, ignoring 
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various requirements and grant amounts. State grants that were excluded are those that mandate 
innovative, non-commercialized technology and grants that are given to support research of 
renewable projects instead of facility construction. Figure 3.8 presents the number of states that 
offer a state grant in each year. 
Power Purchase Agreements 
Power purchase agreements provide a stable stream of revenue that could boost the probability 
and or reduce the revenue uncertainty associated with an LFGE project. The retail electricity 
suppliers would offer purchasing contracts to renewable generators as a means to fulfill their 
RPS requirements. The contracts promise to purchase electricity at a specified rate for some 
specified period of time. Figure 3.9 presents the number of states in which a power purchase 
agreement program is available. 
The data are included in the model as a dummy variable that indicates whether there is a retail 
electricity supplier in the state that offers such a purchase program. 
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Figure 3.8. Time Trend of Number of States in which a Power Purchase Agreement is Available 
Note: Power purchase agreements are offered by utilities. The graph represents the total number of 
states that have at least one utility company that offers power purchase agreements 
 
Year fixed effects 
The inclusion of year fixed effects is designed to control for the factors that change by time, but 
are common to all landfills. For example, federal policies such as the Section 29 tax credit were 
uniformly available to all landfills that started their service between 1992 and 1998. Also, factors 
such as the availability of landfill recovery and use technology are largely similar to all landfills, 
and thus only vary by time. The inclusion of yearly dummy variables controls for these effects 
that are common to all landfills in each year. 
State fixed effects 
The inclusion of state fixed effects is designed to control for time-invariant factors that are 
common to all landfills within each state. Examples of state fixed effects could be any state 
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policy that stays constant during the time period at which the data are available. To illustrate, 
property tax on energy projects that are not modified during the time frame could be a state fixed 
effect that affects project decisions. 
Individual Landfill Effects 
There are various individual landfill characteristics that affect the decision to open a project. 
While landfill characteristics such as waste in place, temperature, and type of ownership can be 
observed, many other characteristics that affect the probability of project development are not 
observable or readily available in a data format. For example, the degree of risk aversion differs 
by landfill owner, yet these are unobservable. The same is true for the preference to adopt a 
technology. Further, data for factors such as organic content and moisture content of the waste 
are not readily available. Assuming that these factors are constant in time for each landfill, the 
inclusion of individual fixed effect will control for such factors. 
 
 
The study estimates the effects of the RPS, state grant, production tax credit, and investment tax 
credit on the adoption of LFGE projects. The variable for the RPS policy is the yearly fractional 
RPS rate, represented for each state. Production tax credit is a variable of the cents given per 
kilowatt of electricity generation and investment tax credit is represented as a percentage of cost 
of installment. The state grant variable is a dummy that indicates whether there is an opening for 
grant proposal for each state and year. The dummy variable for whether a state has an entity 
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offering power purchase agreements and a dummy variable for the existence of an alternative 
compliance payment are other policy variables tested in the study.  
The control variables include electricity price and gas price – averaged for 3 years. Landfill 
characteristics such as waste in place, age of landfill, temperature, precipitation, distance to 
nearest power grid, and public ownership are also considered as control variables. 
 
Model Specification 
Table 3.3 presents the variables included in the final model specification that was used in 
econometric estimation along with a brief description of the each variable. The estimation results 
from different specifications are presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 3.3 Model Specification table 
Variable Description Source 
State policies 
  
Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) 
Variable is equal to the RPS level 
(percentage) for the corresponding year 
and state. 
DSIRE database 
State grants 
Variable is equal to 1 if the state accepts 
project proposals in that year. 
DSIRE database 
State Production Tax 
Credits (PTC) 
Variable equal to the cent-per-kilowatt 
value if the state has a PTC policy in that 
year. Zero otherwise. 
DSIRE database 
State Investment 
Tax Credits (ITC) 
Variable is equal to the percentage of cost 
covered by the state ITC, if the state has 
an ITC policy in that year. Zero 
otherwise. 
DSIRE database 
Energy Prices 
  
Electricity prices 
The 3 year average of the state average 
retail electricity price. 
EIA 
Gas prices 
The 3 year average of the state citygate 
natural gas price. 
EIA 
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Control Variables 
  
Methane Potential 
Measured by waste, precipitation and 
temperature  
Waste-in-place(WIP) 
The amount of waste placed in each 
landfill in tons. Scaled by dividing all 
values by the mean 
USEPA 
Precipitation 
The amount of rainfall averaged for years 
1999 to 2005 on the county level. Scaled 
by dividing with mean. 
Authors of Creating 
County-Level Estimates 
from National Weather 
Service Data 
Temperature 
The temperature averaged for year 1999 
to 2005 on the county level. Scaled by 
dividing with mean 
Authors of Creating 
County-Level Estimates 
from National Weather 
Service Data 
Interaction of Waste 
and precipitation 
Multiplication of WIP and precipitation 
variables  
Interaction of Waste 
and Temperature 
Multiplication of WIP and temperature 
variables  
Distance to the 
nearest power grid 
The distance from each landfill to the 
nearest power grid with capacity larger 
than 40kv. Distance in kilometers. 
NREL 
Public ownership 
Variable equal to 1 if the owner of the 
landfill is a public entity. 
USEPA 
Year fixed effect 
Year fixed effects are included as year 
dummy variables. The values for each 
year dummies are equal to one if the data 
corresponds to that year 
 
State fixed effect 
State fixed effects are included as state 
dummy variables. The state dummy is 
equal to one if the landfill is located in 
that state 
 
Individual landfill 
fixed effect 
Individual fixed effect is included in the 
linear probability model by demeaning. 
In the random effect logit model, it is 
included as the random effect term. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
In order to determine the influence of renewable policies on whether or not a landfill develops an 
LFGE project, the study employs two kinds of econometric models – the linear probability 
model and the logit model. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the data includes characteristics 
and policy data for 2853 landfills in the United States over 20 years. The dependent variable 
should represent a landfill owner/developer’s decision to build or not to build a LFGE project at 
the landfill site in a given year. If a landfill does not have a project in a specific year, it means 
that the landfill owner decided not to build a project that year, thus the decision variable would 
be zero. In the first year that a landfill has a project – the project open year, the landfill owner has 
decided to build a LFGE project and the decision variable would be one. However, once the 
project is built the landfill owner no longer makes a choice. Thus, the data mimics the form of a 
survival model, in which the subject (mostly a patient) survives for a period of time and dies, 
after which the data ceases to exist.22 
 
4.1 Linear Probability, Logit, and Mixed Logit Models: Basic Concepts 
 
This study uses three econometric models to estimate the effect of the RPS and other financial 
incentives on LFGE project decision. The three models used are the linear probability model, the 
logit model, and a mixed logit model that incorporates random effects.  
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The most straight forward method to estimate a project adoption choice such as in the present 
case, is to use a logit model. The logit model allows one to estimate how different factors affect 
the probability that an event will occur (i.e. adoption of an LFGE project). The model is 
estimated through maximum likelihood methods. The discrete nature of the dependent variable 
makes the logit model more appropriate than an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model.1  
However, it is complicated to account for fixed effects in a logit model, especially when there are 
a large number of individuals. The simple method of “demeaning” used in OLS models cannot 
be used in a logit model, because “demeaning” the data would alter the form of the dependent 
variable so that it is no longer appropriate. The solution to the issue of including individual 
effects is to use a linear probability model, conditional logit model, or random effect logit model. 
The conditional logit model is excluded, because it would only use landfill data that eventually 
does adopt a project, dropping more than half of the data. Consequently, estimation is done using 
the linear probability, logit, and random effect logit models. 
 
Logit model 
As mentioned before, the logit model is a straight-forward way to estimate the effects of 
independent variables on the probability that an event would occur. The dependent variable is in 
                                           
1 An ordinary least squares (OLS) model assumes that the dependent variable is an unbounded and continuous value. Thus, 
predictions from an OLS model can result in real numbers from negative infinity to positive infinity. However, the dependent 
variable of the present study is whether a landfill owner/developer opens a project, which is a represented by the numbers 0 
and 1. Predictions from an OLS model would not make sense, since they can be any real number that is not 0 or 1. 
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a discrete form – 0 or 1. The logit method assumes an implied utility curve that is determined by 
the independent variables. If the utility is above a threshold, the dependent variable would be 1, 
meaning that the project is adopted, and if the utility is below the threshold, the dependent 
variable would be zero.23 In a logit model the state and year fixed effect can be included as 
dummy variables, but individual landfill fixed effects cannot be included as dummies, because 
this would create more than 2000 variables.  
 
Random Effect Logit Model 
The random effect logit model is the same as a logit model in that the model estimates the effect 
of independent variables on the probability that a discrete choice event will occur. However, this 
model is able to account for individual random effects for each landfill, which means important 
unobserved variables, such as organic content of waste and landfill owner risk preference, are 
controlled. In order to control for unobserved individual landfill effects, the individual landfill 
effects are simulated and included in the model. Including unobserved individual landfill random 
effects greatly improves the model in that it prevents bias from omitted variables. (Greene 2012)  
 
Linear Probability Model 
A linear probability model is an Ordinary Least Squares model, same as a linear regression 
model, except that the dependent variable is interpreted as a probability.24 The dependent variable 
in the present case would be the dummy variable that indicates whether a landfill has started an 
４６ 
 
LFGE project in a particular year. The independent variable would be the factors that account for 
the project decisions: individual landfill characteristics, financial incentives, and state, year, and 
individual fixed effects. The regression would be run the same way an OLS regression would be 
run. However, a crucial shortcoming of the model is that the predicted values for the dependent 
variable would not necessarily be between 0 and 1.25 Since we want to interpret the dependent 
variable as the probability of opening a project, it would be difficult to make any meaningful 
interpretation of the estimation coefficient in terms of how much they affect this probability. 
Nevertheless, because of the simplicity that an OLS model lends when incorporating individual 
fixed effects, the study used the linear probability model as an estimation method. 
 
 
4.2 The Models 
 
Logit Model 
In order to estimate a logit model we assume an implied utility curve, which in the present case 
would be the net present discounted benefit of an LFGE project to the landfill owner, with the 
following variables: 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
 
４７ 
 
where i is a landfill index, t is a year index, and s is a state index. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector including non-
policy variables that may affect the net benefit such as landfill age and electricity prices. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector including policy variables such as RPS design parameters (e.g., target level, eligible 
generation technologies, clauses on RECs) and state incentives. 𝜏𝑡 is year fixed effect to capture 
common factors that affect all landfills such as progress in generation technology and federal 
policy variables. 𝜆𝑠 is a state fixed effect that includes the common factors that affect landfills 
in the same state in the same way – time invariant state characteristics such as state size would be 
included in this variable. 𝜏𝑡, and 𝜆𝑠 control for factors that are unobservable to researchers but 
affect the decision-making of landfill owners. 𝜃 is a vector of parameters to be estimated based 
on data (e.g., revealed decisions that landfill owners have made). 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. If a 
landfill owner has not decided to build a landfill prior to time t – 1, the probability that landfill 
owner i will make the decision to adopt a LFGE project in year t is: 
𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) = 𝑃(𝜋𝑖𝑡 > 0 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) 
= 𝑃[𝑒𝑖𝑡 > − 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)] 
Assuming 𝑒𝑖𝑡 has a logistic distribution, hence the logit model, the probability has the following 
closed form: 
 
𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) =
exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]
1 + exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]
. 
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The logit model is a Maximum Likelihood Estimator, which produces estimated parameters that 
maximize the likelihood that the observed data would emerge given the parameters. The joint 
probability function for a landfill i to not adopt a LFGE project until year T would be: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖1 = 0, 𝑑𝑖2 = 0, … , 𝑑𝑖𝑇 = 0 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) 
= ∏ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡=1
. 
For a landfill that has adopted LFGE project at year k, the joint probability function of the k 
decisions before year k+1 is:  
 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖1 = 0, 𝑑𝑖2 = 0, … , 𝑑𝑖𝑘 = 1| 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) 
= ∫ ∏ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜆𝑠, 𝜏𝑡;  𝜃) 𝑃 (𝑑𝑖𝑘 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑘, 𝑍𝑖𝑘 , 𝜆𝑠, 𝜏𝑘;  𝜃) 
𝑘−1
𝑡=1 .     (5) 
 
The coefficients that maximize function (5) would be the estimation results. 
max
𝜃
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿(𝜃)  = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1                (6) 
 
 
Random Effect Logit Model 
The mixed logit model with random effects is a well established method of incorporating 
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individual effects to a discrete choice situation, by simulating the random effects and applying 
them to the logit model framework. (McFadden and Train, 2000)  
The random effect logit model would have an implied utility curve as shown below: 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠, 𝜂𝑖;  𝜃) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
 
The utility function looks the same as that of the logit model, except for the inclusion of the 
individual random effect term - 𝜂𝑖. This term controls for unobserved time-invariant individual 
landfill characteristics, such as landfill owner risk preference and organic waste content. 
The closed form probability that a project would be adopted is similar to that of the logit model, 
except for the inclusion of 𝜂𝑖: 
𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃) =
exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]
1 + exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]
 
 
However, since 𝜂𝑖 is a result of simulation, the joint probability function for a landfill i to not 
adopt a LFGE project until year T would be: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖1 = 0, 𝑑𝑖2 = 0, … , 𝑑𝑖𝑇 = 0 | 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜂𝑖;  𝜃) 
= ∫ ∏ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡;  𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑑𝐹(𝜂𝑖;  𝛾).               
𝐹(𝜂𝑖, 𝛾) is the cumulative density function of 𝜂𝑖 and 𝛾 is a vector of parameters to 
characterize the distribution. In the estimation, the researcher can specify the distribution and 
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estimate 𝛾 together with 𝜃. It is common to assume that 𝜂𝑖 has a normal distribution with 
mean zero and 𝛾 to be a scalar for the standard deviation. The integral in the above equation can 
be approximated using simulations or the quadrature method. 
For a landfill that has adopted LFGE project at year k, the joint probability function of the k 
decisions before year k+1 is:  
 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖1 = 0, 𝑑𝑖2 = 0, … , 𝑑𝑖𝑘 = 1| 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡;  𝜃) 
= ∫ ∏ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑡;  𝜃) 𝑃 (𝑑𝑖𝑘 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑘, 𝑍𝑖𝑘, 𝜂𝑖 , 𝜏𝑘;  𝜃) 
𝑘−1
𝑡=1 𝑑𝐹(𝜂𝑖;  𝛾).      
 
With these joint probability functions, we can write down the log-likelihood function over all 
landfills in the data. The parameters 𝜃 and 𝛾 can be estimated using the simulated maximum 
likelihood method (SMLE). (Train, 1999) 
max
𝜃,𝛾
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿(𝜃, 𝛾)  = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ,                                             (7) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖 is simulated choice probabilities – the individual joint probabilities that include a 
simulated random error term. In the case of a landfill that has not adopted a LFGE project by 
time T, it is used to simulate the choice probability defined in equation (8).  
One way of approximating 𝑃𝑖 is: 
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?̂?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤
𝑠 ∏ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜂𝑖
𝑠, 𝜏𝑡;  𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑆
𝑠=1 .                                  
 
𝜂𝑖
𝑠 is the sth random draw from the standard normal distribution (when assuming unobserved 
landfill characteristics 𝜂𝑖 has a normal distribution). 𝑤𝑖
𝑠 is the weight and equal to 1/S with S 
being the total number of random draws. The choice probability 𝑃𝑖 can also be simulated using 
other techniques such as randomized Halton sequences or Gauss-Hermite quadrature to improve 
efficiency.  
Partial Effects of Logit Estimation 
Because the coefficients of a discrete choice model are odds ratios, one must calculate the 
marginal effect of each variable in order the estimate the effectiveness of each renewable policy 
on the probability that a landfill owner will adopt a project. In general the marginal effect of a 
variable in a discrete choice model with the probability function 𝐸[𝑦 | 𝑥] = 𝐹(𝑥′𝜃)  would look 
like the following: 
∂𝐸[𝑦 |𝑥]
∂x
= [
𝑑 𝐹(𝑥′𝜃)
𝑑(𝑥′𝜃)
]  ×  𝜃 
In a logit model, the probability of project adoption can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠; 𝜃) =
exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠; 𝜃)]
1 + exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠; 𝜃)]
. 
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Then the marginal effects the variables would be: 
𝑑𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠; 𝜃)
𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠)
× 𝜃 =  
exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]
[1 + exp [𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑡, 𝜆𝑠;  𝜃)]]2
× 𝜃 
 
The average partial effect of each variable can be estimated in two ways. The marginal effect 
function shown above can be calculated at the means of the data. Another method would be to 
calculate the marginal effects at every observation and take the sample average of the individual 
marginal effects as the average partial effect. In large samples the two methods produce 
approximately the same answer.26 
Linear Probability Model 
Because the unobserved characteristics of a landfill (i.e. risk-averseness of the landfill owner, 
etc.)  may critically affect the decision to build a LFGE project, a model that controls for 
individual fixed effects is the ideal model that can represent the true relationship between the 
policies and project decision. For this reason, a data was also analyzed using a Linear Probability 
Model. In general, the LFGE project decisions have the probability function as follows: 
Prob(Y = 1|𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) 
Prob(Y = 0|𝑥) = 1 − 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) 
In the above probability functions, x is a matrix of the independent variables that affect Y. One 
may simply assume that the function f retains a linear form: 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) = 𝑥′𝛽  
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Because 𝐸[𝑦|𝑥] = 0[1 − 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)] + 1[𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)] = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽), 
𝑦 =  𝐸[𝑦|𝑥] + [𝑦 −  𝐸[𝑦|𝑥]] 
= 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝜀 
It is simple to estimate individual fixed effects with a linear probability model, but it has a 
crucial flaw. The left hand side of the regression equation represents the probability that y = 1, 
but the model is not constrained such that y is in the 0-1 interval. For this reason, the linear 
probability model is not used often. In this paper, it was used nevertheless as a simple method to 
control for fixed effects before the somewhat complicated mixed logit model was applied. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Results 
 
Econometric estimation was conducted using the variables specified in section 3.2, using the 
linear probability model, logit model, and mixed-logit model with individual random effects, as 
presented in section 4.2. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5 with partial effects 
for the logit models. The two logit models show that none of the policy variables are significant 
although they are all positive. The linear probability model produces positive and significant 
results for the RPS and state grant variables, but yields different results for the gas price and 
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production tax credit variables. 
Table 5. Linear Probability and Logit Model Estimation Results 
 Linear 
Probability 
Logit 
Mixed Logit with Random 
Effects 
  Est. Est. P.E. Est. P.E. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RPS 0.000519* 0.00976 0.000131 0.0148 0.000073 
 (0.000309) (0.0134) (0.00018) (0.0157) (0.00008) 
Electricity price 0.00219 0.146 0.00196 0.141 0.000695 
 (0.00206) (0.101) (0.00135) (0.115) (0.00064) 
Gas price -0.00311** 0.452*** 0.00607*** 0.558*** 0.00275* 
 (0.00150) (0.148) (0.002) (0.172) (0.0015) 
Lagged state grant 0.0246*** 0.246 0.00363 0.363 0.00206 
 (0.00661) (0.221) (0.00359) (0.257) (0.00184) 
Investment tax credit 0.0117 0.543 0.0073 0.556 0.00275 
 (0.0169) (0.665) (0.00893) (0.757) (0.00388) 
Production tax credit -0.00922 0.731 0.00983 0.599 0.00296 
 (0.00867) (0.532) (0.00712) (0.577) (0.00322) 
Waste in place  0.322* 0.00433* 0.601* 0.00297 
  (0.175) (0.00236) (0.353) (0.00197) 
Temperature  -0.155 -0.00208 -0.428 -0.00211 
  (0.605) (0.00813) (0.998) (0.00489) 
Precipitation  0.103 0.00139 0.0617 0.000305 
  (0.203) (0.00273) (0.335) (0.00167) 
Interaction- waste & temperature  -0.193 -0.00259 -0.359 -0.00177 
  (0.161) (0.00217) (0.318) (0.00167) 
Interaction – waste & 
precipitation 
 0.0238 0.00032 0.0778 0.000384 
  (0.0411) (0.00055) (0.0871) (0.00042) 
Landfill age 0.00657*** 0.0452*** 0.000607*** 0.0779*** 0.000384*** 
 (0.000557) (0.0120) (0.00016) (0.0232) (0.00014) 
Landfill age squared -1.39e-05* -0.000737*** 0.00001*** -
0.00116*** 
-0.00001** 
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 (7.92e-06) (0.000189) (0) (0.000331) (0) 
Distance to power grid  -0.0440*** -0.00059*** -0.0756*** -0.000373** 
  (0.0165) (0.00022) (0.0292) (0.00017) 
Public ownership  -0.532*** -0.00757*** -0.777*** -0.0042*** 
  (0.0964) (0.00146) (0.199) (0.0016) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes  
State fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes  
Individual fixed effect Yes no  Yes  
Constant -0.131*** -7.530***  -8.711***  
  (1.269)    
Observations 27,318 27,318  27,318  
R-squared 0.034     
Number of lfid 1,774     1,774  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) contain the estimated coefficients for equations (6) and 
(7), respectively. The partial effects in columns (3) and (5) are the marginal effects calculated at the mean of each 
variable. The partial effects in column (5) are derived when random effects are equal to zero. The asterisks indicate 
the significance levels of each coefficient estimation: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5.1.1 Estimation Results for Linear Probability Model 
The results from the linear probability model are presented in column (1) of Table 5. As noted 
before, there is no sensible way to interpret the coefficient of the linear probability model 
because it fits a discrete choice into a continuous model. However, the significant positive 
coefficient for the RPS variable indicates that a higher RPS has a positive effect on LFGE project 
decision. Unlike the RPS variable, the gas price variable behaves in the opposite direction that 
would be predicted by theory. Since the gas price is revenue for an LFGE owner, it should 
encourage project development, but the estimation predicts differently. Lagged state grant is 
positive and significant, which is consistent to theory, because to build and open a project takes 
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about a year after the funding decision is made.  
The estimated coefficients of landfill age and landfill age squared behave in the expected 
direction, that is, the probability of an LFGE project draws an inverted U shape with respect to 
landfill age, which can be related to the fact that the methane production curve shows a hill-
shaped progression with respect to the age of waste. However, calculation yields the peak of this 
hill to be at approximately 240 years, whereas, research show the peak methane production 
would be somewhere between 7 to 20 years after waste placement. The delayed peak may have 
occurred because a typical landfill continues to accept waste for about 30-40 years, making the 
methane production curve flatter. However, even such a delay should not be as great as 240 years. 
Nevertheless, the data includes landfills that are from a year old to 99 years old with a mean age 
of 24. Thus, the estimated coefficients of the landfill age variables indicate that, within the 
dataset, landfill age has a positive effect that is increasing at a decreasing rate.  
The electricity price is expected to have a positive effect on the decision to start an LFGE project, 
but the estimation result indicates a positive effect that is not significant. The same is true for 
state production tax credit. The coefficient for the investment tax credit is estimated to be 
positive but insignificant. 
 
 5.1.2 Estimation Results for Logit and Random Effects Logit Model 
The values in column (2) are the coefficients resulting from the logit model, and the values in 
column (3) are the partial effects at the mean of each variable. The RPS variable has a positive 
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coefficient, but is not significant. The same is true for the electricity price variable. However, the 
result indicates that gas price has a positive and significant effect on LFGE project decision. 
Again this is consistent to what would be expected. The partial effect - estimated at the mean of 
each independent variable – is 0.006. The figure represents the increase in probability when the 
gas price is increased by $1 per thousand cubic feet. Although, is it only 0.6% probability 
increase, considering the fluctuation in natural gas price, it can be an important factor. The state 
grant, state PTC, and state ITC variables all are positive but insignificant. 
The waste in place is significant at the 10% significance level, and the partial effect is .00433. 
This means that when the waste is increased by approximately 5 million tons (the wasteinplace2 
variable is the wasteinplace variable divided by its mean – 5 million tons), the probability of 
opening a project increases 0.4%. Although the coefficient is not significant, the temperature 
variable is not estimated to affect project decision in the intuitive direction, because a higher 
temperature is likely to increase methane production. The same is true for the interaction variable 
for temperature and waste in place. For every additional amount of waste, the effect of an 
increase in temperature is negative. The precipitation variable is not significant but behaves in 
accordance to theory. More moisture content increases the possibility of an LFGE project.  
The coefficients landfill age and its squared term suggest that the probability of opening a project 
draws an inverted U shape with a peak around 30 years. This is somewhat consistent with the 
theory that methane production occurs around 8 years after the landfill is open and that landfills 
accept waste for about 30-40 years.  
The distance from power grid has a significant negative effect on project decision. The partial 
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effect value indicates that if the nearest power grid becomes 1 km closer, the probability of 
opening a project will increase by 0.06%. Public ownership of the landfill is estimated to 
decrease the probability of an LFGE project by 0.4%. 
The results of the random effect logit model are similar to those of the logit model, in terms of 
the coefficients’ significance and the direction of effect. However, the partial effects of each 
significant variable are estimated to be smaller than those of the logit model. A dollar increase in 
thousand cubic feet of gas has a 0.3% increase in LFGE adoption probability. And the effect of 5 
million tons of more waste is 0.3% instead of 0.4%. The partial effects of both the distance to 
grid variable and the public ownership variable are also smaller than those shown in the logit 
model. The coefficients of the landfill age and its squared term indicate a similar inverted U-
shaped curve with a slightly steeper slope, but a very similar peak – around 33 years after the 
landfill is open. 
 
 5.1.3 Comparison of Results for the Logit Models and the Linear Probability Model 
The results for the logit and mixed-logit models are overall similar in the direction of the 
coefficients, although the partial effects appear dampened in the mixed-logit model. The two 
logit models and the linear probability model have the same signs (negative/positive) for all 
policy and economic variables except for gas price and production tax credit. Also, RPS and 
state grant is shown to have a positive and significant effect in the linear probability model, 
whereas, it is positive but not significant in the logit models. The linear probability model yields 
a negative and significant coefficient for gas price, whereas the two logit models yield a positive 
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and significant result for gas price. Although not significant in any of the models, the production 
tax credit has a negative sign in the linear probability model, while it shows positive effect in the 
two logit models.  
Another difference of the estimations is that the logit models predict that the peak for project 
adoption occurs at 30 and 33 years, while the linear probability model estimates the peak at 240 
years after a landfill is open. 
 
5.2.1 Observed outcomes vs. simulated outcomes 
The effects of each financial incentive can be shown in graphs that compare the actual number 
of LFGE projects with the simulated number of projects adopted in the absence of a financial 
incentive. 
 
Figure 5.1 Predicted LFGE project adoption rate in the absence of an RPS 
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(The prediction was made using the logit model estimations, setting RPS = 0 for all states in all 
years) 
 
Figure 5.1 plots the number of projects that would be adopted, if there were no RPS but all other 
conditions were the same. It is presented in comparison to the actual number of projects adopted. 
The simulation is based on the logit estimation. As shown by the insignificant but positive 
coefficient of the RPS, in the absence of an RPS policy there would be marginally smaller 
number of LFGE projects. The total number of projects in 1999 is 639, compared to the 
simulated number of 600 in the absence of an RPS policy. The gap between the two plots widen 
near the late 1990’s, which is the time that the first states started to enforce the RPS policy.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Predicted LFGE project adoption rate in the absence of ITC 
(The prediction was made using the logit model estimations, setting ITC = 0 for all states in all 
years) 
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Figure 5.3 Predicted LFGE project adoption rate in the absence of PTC 
(The prediction was made using the logit model estimations, setting PTC = 0 for all states in all 
years) 
 
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 present similar plots for the state ITC and PTC, the absences of which are 
estimated to have an even smaller effect. For the ITC and PTC policies, the difference in number 
of landfills in 1999 is only 9. 
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Figure 5.4 Predicted LFGE Project Adoption Rate in the Absence of State Grant 
(The prediction was made using the logit model estimations, setting State Grant = 0 for all states 
in all years) 
 
The simulated effect of the absence of a state grant is shown in figure 5.4. The number of 
adopted projects is estimated to be slightly smaller when there is no state grant. In the late 1990’s, 
state grant appears to pick up the number of projects, although slightly. This is the time that the 
number of available state grants started to pick up. 
 
5.2.2 Predictions from Linear Probability Model 
As mentioned in the end of section 4.2, the linear probability model suffers a critical flaw in that 
the model does not confine the predictions to the 0 to 1 interval. Thus, it is impossible to 
interpret the results of this model. 
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To check whether the predictions from the linear probability model make sense, I examined the 
distribution of the predicted values. A histogram of the predicted probabilities is shown in Figure 
5.5. More than a quarter of the predicted probabilities are negative. This result shows that it is 
unlikely that the probability function is linear. 
 
Figure 5.5. Histogram of Predicted Probabilities from the Linear Probability Model 
 
5.3 Discussion of Results and Issues 
The results from the linear probability model are quite different from those from the logit models. 
In this model, RPS and the availability of a state grant in the previous year appears to have a 
significant positive effect on LFGE project decision, whereas, the gas price has a negative effect. 
The different results of the logit and linear probability model are likely to have originated from 
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the limitations of the linear model to estimate discrete choice models. Because the linear model 
estimates a curve that fits the given data, the estimates can be largely affected by a small range of 
particular values, making predictions outside the data range largely inaccurate. Consequently, I 
give more weight to the results of the logit model estimation. 
 
Gas Price, Waste, Distance to Power Grid, Public Ownership, and Landfill Age 
The results of the logit model estimation indicate that gas price, waste, distance to power grid, 
public ownership, and landfill age significantly affect the decision to start an LFGE project. 
Because gas price is directly linked to the major source of revenue in a project, it must have a 
positive effect on project decision. The amount of waste is directly related to the amount of 
methane that can be collected from a landfill, which is one of the first factors that landfill owners 
and developers consider in making a decision to build a project. The distance to a power grid is 
can widely vary for each landfill, and is a source of significant variation in cost. Another 
important characteristic is the ownership of the landfill. Although I had expected that public 
landfill owners would more eager to open a gas-to-energy facility as a public service, estimations 
show that private owners are keener to build and operated LFGE project. The landfill age affects 
project decision as can be predicted by the shape of the methane production curve across time 
after waste placement. 
 
Tax Credits 
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RPS, state grant, production tax credit, and investment tax credit are estimated to be insignificant 
in the landfill owner or developer’s decision to build a project, although the positive directions of 
the coefficient are consistent with expectation. Tax credits can be expected not to benefit public 
landfills because they are not subject to tax. However, a model with an interaction variable of tax 
credits and public ownership does not show that the effects of tax credit are not significant. The 
insignificant estimation results may be due to the small variation in the PTC and ITC variables. 
Only a total of six states had a PTC and seven ITC in the period covered by the dataset. 
State Grants 
The availability of a state grant in the previous year is also estimated to be insignificant in 
landfill gas-to-energy project adoption. The complicated with the lagged state grant variable is 
that the time that a project is open might take longer than a year, although many state grant 
policies require that the project be built within a year of the funding decision. 
RPS 
The RPS is also estimated to be insignificant in project adoption. The RPS data itself may be a 
problem. In our model, the RPS percent is a state’s specific fractional target for a particular year, 
but it does not take account of the final RPS goal and its achievement date. When landfill owners 
make decisions on whether to open the project or not, they may not only consider this year’s RPS 
rate but also what the final RPS target is going to be and when the goal will be realized. Some 
landfill owners may hold opening until the year when the RPS target rate is fully realized, and 
some others may just choose to open this year since the target year is approaching. The current 
value of the benefits of future years should be included into the RPS variable by employing a 
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scientific way to discount the future RPS rates into present rates. Further, eight states such as 
Indiana have established voluntary RPS goals. Although they are not compulsory and have no 
penalty on the utilities who do not meet the objectives, there could be some influence on the 
utilities’ electricity-generating resource portfolio and the decisions of landfill owners, compared 
with states that do not have even a voluntary RPS. In our model, the RPS percent values for these 
eight states are entered as zero and therefore some effects are omitted. The voluntary RPS goal 
needs to be incorporated into the model in a way that is different from compulsory RPS.  
Furthermore, RPS ratio may not be directly related to the benefits of operating a landfill project. 
The landfill owners receive revenue from getting renewable energy certificates (RECs) by 
generating electricity. But the prices of RECs and embedded price premiums are determined by 
both supply and demand conditions. In a competitive market, the revenue that landfill owners 
can get actually depends on the competition with many other forms of renewable energy. In this 
case, the data of the supply of other forms of renewable energy in each state for 20 years is 
needed. And even after such data is achieved, the inclusion of this factor would cause 
endogeneity problems because many states have set their RPS goals with consideration of the 
already existing amount of renewable energy. An ideal variable would be one that represents the 
amount of additional renewable energy that a state wants to achieve for each year. 
Electricity Price 
The electricity price data is problematic because it is the retail electricity price, which can be 
considerably different from wholesale electricity prices. Many of the LFGE facilities would sell 
the generated power to a utility company, receiving the wholesale price. The EIA does not have 
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the wholesale electricity price for all of the states, but rather prices for several regions of the 
United States, centered in the wholesale markets formed after the restructuring of the power 
market. This data is only available for several years. The difference between retail and wholesale 
electricity price is likely to have affected the estimation, because electricity price should be an 
important consideration in starting a power generating facility.  
Year Fixed Effects 
All three of the models include year fixed effects that are mostly significant. The year fixed 
effects control for federal policies such as the Section 29 tax credit, and the NSPS regulation. 
These federal policies are suggested to have driven many landfill owners and developers to start 
LFGE projects. Consequently, it may be true that LFGE projects decisions benefited more from 
federal policies rather than state policies. 
Weather Variables 
The logit estimations indicate that precipitation has a positive coefficient, but that the effect is 
not significant. On the other hand, the temperature variable has a negative coefficient that is not 
significant. This is unexpected because a warmer climate should help anaerobic decomposition 
of the waste and improve methane production. The estimation results might be due to state fixed 
effect, some of which are estimated to have significant effect on project decision. Assuming that 
a state has an overall similar climate, controlling for each state’s time-invariant characteristics 
might have absorbed some of the effect of precipitation and temperature. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
As an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Landfill Gas-to-Energy projects have been 
encouraged by a variety of policy measures. This study has examined the effectiveness of each 
policy measure in increasing the probability that the landfill owner or developer would install an 
LFGE project. 
The factors that affect the adoption of the LFGE project include physical characteristics of the 
landfill, including the organic content of the waste, the moisture content, temperature, and age of 
the landfill. These characteristics determine the amount of methane that is produced at the 
landfill site. The distance from the landfill to the nearest power grid makes the building cost 
different. Further, private and public landfill owners are expected to behave differently. 
The policies aimed to support project adoption include the state Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
federal and state tax credits, the New Source Performance Standards, state and local grants, 
green power purchase programs, among many others. The price of electricity and natural gas is 
the revenue of many of the LFGE projects, and thus are influential factors. In addition to this, the 
availability of end-users, the diffusion of information are other factors that determine project 
adoption. 
In this study, I estimated the effects of three four major state policies – RPS, production tax 
credit, investment tax credit, and state grants – on the decision of landfill owners or developers to 
build an LFGE project, using a linear probability model, logit model, and a random effect logit 
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model. Aside for the four policy variables, electricity and gas prices, waste in place, precipitation, 
temperature, landfill age, distance to grid and public ownership were controlled for in the model. 
The importance of the linear probability model and random effect logit model is that they can 
control for the individual landfill characteristics. For example, the individual landfill owner’s 
risk preference and preference for technology can be an important variable. In order to include 
such factors in the estimation, the linear probability model with individual fixed effects and the 
mixed logit model with random effects were used. 
 
The results of the estimation indicate that the state policies are insignificant in an LFGE project 
decision, although the directions of the effects are estimated to be positive. The gas price is 
estimated to have a significant positive effect on the probability of LFGE project adoption. Also, 
the model correctly estimates the effect of the landfill’s age and distance to a power grid. An 
interesting result is that public ownership of a landfill is negatively related to the probability of 
project adoption. 
 
The reason that the RPS is insignificant may be because landfill gas-to-energy projects are less 
competitive in the renewables market. In an interview with an LFGE project developer, he 
mentioned that many utilities might prefer to fulfill their RPS requirements by purchasing from 
wind farms, largely because LFGE facilities have significantly smaller generation capacities than 
wind power. The problem with the state tax credit variables is that they are not very prevalent. 
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The lack of variance in the independent variable could have lent weak results. Another problem 
with these state policy variables are that they last for a while, and the expectation of future policy 
could affect landfill project decisions, but it is difficult to correctly model these future 
expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
７１ 
 
Endnotes 
1. J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins, & J. J. Ephraums (eds.), Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment 
(Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University 
Press,1990), from http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf 
2. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed May 21, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/basic-info/index.html#a02  
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Is Landfill Gas Green Energy? Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources 
Defense Council (March 2003). 
4. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed April 20, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/projects-candidates/operational.html 
5. Natural Resources Defense Council, Is Landfill Gas Green Energy? Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources 
Defense Council (March 2003). 
6. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed  April 20, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/basic-info/index.html#a03 
7. “Landfill Gas Primer – An Overview for Environmental Health Professionals,” Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, Accessed April 19, 2013, 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/landfill/html/ch2.html 
8. “Landfill Gas Primer – An Overview for Environmental Health Professionals,” Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, Accessed April 19, 2013, 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/landfill/html/ch2.html 
9. Vasudevan Rajaram, Faisal Zia Siddiqui, & M. Emran Khan, “Landfill Gas to Energy: International Status 
and Prospects,” in From landfill gas to energy technologies and challenges, (Leiden, The Netherlands: 
CRC/Balkema, 2012), 13-16,  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=437321. 
10. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed April 21, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/documents/pdfs/generating.pdf 
11. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed April 21, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/basic-info/index.html#a03 
12. “Landfill Methane Outreach Program: Basic Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed April 21, 2013, http://epa.gov/lmop/basic-info/index.html#a03 
13. D 
14. Chris Godlove, & Amanda R. Singleton, “New Financing Options and Incentives for Landfill Gas Energy,” 
Cogeneration & Distributed Generation Journal (April 2010): 25:2, 59. 
15. http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/certificates.shtml?page=5 
16. Natural Resources Defense Council, Is Landfill Gas Green Energy? Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources 
Defense Council (March 2003). 
17. “Landfill Gas Primer – An Overview for Environmental Health Professionals,” Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, Accessed April 19, 2013, 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/landfill/html/ch2.html 
18. Vasudevan Rajaram, Faisal Zia Siddiqui, & M. Emran Khan, “Landfill Gas to Energy: International Status 
and Prospects,” in From landfill gas to energy technologies and challenges, (Leiden, The Netherlands: 
CRC/Balkema, 2012), 10,  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=437321. 
19. Natural Resources Defense Council, Is Landfill Gas Green Energy? Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources 
Defense Council (March 2003).  
20.  Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), a project of N.C. State University and 
the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC). 
21.  Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), a project of N.C. State University and 
the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC).  
22. “Essex Summer School course ‘Survival Analysis’ and EC968. Part II: Introduction to the Analysis of 
Spell Duration Data,” University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic Research, accessed July 10, 
７２ 
 
2012, https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/teaching/stephenj/ec968/pdfs/ec968st3.pdf 
23. William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis 7th Edition (Upper Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2012), 721-
728. 
24. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 727 
25. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 727 
26. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 729-30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
７３ 
 
Appendix 1 : Model Specification Tests 
The three policy variables of interest – RPS, production tax credit, investment tax credit and 
lagged state grant – are included in all specifications. The state grant, power purchasing 
agreement, and alternative compliance payments were included and left out as seen fit. The 
natural gas price is shown to have a significant effect on the probability that a landfill developer 
would decide to build a LFGE project. The positive sign of the coefficient is consistent with the 
theory, because natural gas price would be a source of revenue for the LFGE owner. Landfill age 
and its squared term turn out to be significant, with a positive sign for landfill age and negative 
for landfill age squared. This should be the case because methane production would draw a bell-
shaped curve across the age of a landfill. The variable that measures the distance to a power grid 
also behaves consistent to theory, indicating a greater distance to a power grid would make a 
landfill less favorable for an LFGE project. The public ownership dummy variable is negative 
and significant, which means that if a landfill is owned by a public entity, such as a city 
government, then it is less likely that there would be a LFGE project on the landfill. This could 
be because private enterprises are generally more sensitive to profitability than are government 
officials. However, the opposite might be true because public landfill managers might take on a 
project to win political support or as a public service. Nevertheless, results show that public 
landfills are less likely to have a project.  
In the benchmark model – column (1) of Table A1, none of the four policy variables appear to be 
a significant influence on LFGE project development. The addition of the PPA, ACP, and ACP 
rate variables – column (2) - does not change the results except that the ACP dummy and ACP 
rate appear to be significant factors in project decision. However, the signs of both variables are 
the opposite of what is expected. That is, the existence of an Alternative Compliance Payment, 
represented by the ACP dummy, would possibly discourage LFGE adoption because the electric 
utilities might choose to pay the fee instead of buying from renewable generators. However, the 
estimation results show that having an alternative payment policy encourages landfill energy 
development. Further, a higher ACP rate should encourage more renewable energy development, 
but the estimation results show the opposite effect. There does not seem to be a good explanation 
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for the behavior of these two variables. 
When all policy variables are controlled – column (4), the state grant dummy and its lagged term 
are significant and the signs are consistent with intuition. When a state government accepts grant 
application, it would take several months to make the funding decision and generally the grant 
stipulates that the project be built within a year after the funding decisions. In a year when grant 
applications are accepted, most developers would wait for the grant decisions and hold off on 
project construction, explaining the negative coefficient. The year after the grant application is 
due, the landfill project that were waiting for the grant decisions would go into construction, 
which explains the positive effect of the lagged state grant variable. The state grant dummy and 
its lagged term behave similarly in the model that includes the state grant dummy in addition to 
the variables in the benchmark model – column (3). The behavior of the two state grant variables 
in the aforementioned two models - column (3) and (4) – might be due to cancelation between 
the two variables. This is because if there was a state grant program in the previous year, it is 
with almost with 100% certainty that this year, there would not be a state grant program. Thus, 
the two variables are close to multi-collinear. Therefore, an accurate model should include just 
one of the two variables. 
 
Table A1. Results of Logit Model estimation 
 
Benchmark 
model 
Model with 
PPA and 
ACP 
Model with 
state grant 
Model with 
PPA, ACP 
and state 
grant 
Present and 
lagged 
energy 
prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Economic Variables      
RPS 0.00979 0.0120 0.00900 0.0109 0.0132 
 
(0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0135) (0.0147) (0.0151) 
Electricity Price 0.146 0.109 0.164 0.126 
 
 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.104) 
 Gas Price 0.452*** 0.373** 0.470*** 0.396*** 
 
 
(0.148) (0.153) (0.148) (0.153) 
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Electricity price (non 
average) 
    
0.148 
     
(0.132) 
Gas price (non 
average) 
    
0.179 
     
(0.114) 
Lagged electricity 
price 
    
-0.0456 
     
(0.134) 
Lagged gas price 
    
0.202* 
     
(0.121) 
State grant 
  
-0.508* -0.560** -0.549** 
   
(0.268) (0.270) (0.270) 
Lagged state grant 0.246 0.301 0.553** 0.647** 0.621** 
 
(0.221) (0.226) (0.275) (0.281) (0.280) 
Investment tax credit 0.543 0.493 0.557 0.487 0.482 
 
(0.665) (0.669) (0.665) (0.670) (0.670) 
Production tax credit 0.731 0.677 0.718 0.662 0.651 
 
(0.532) (0.534) (0.533) (0.534) (0.534) 
Power purchase 
agreement 
 
0.0900 
 
0.182 0.131 
  
(0.233) 
 
(0.238) (0.236) 
Lagged purchase 
agreement 
 
-0.416 
 
-0.507* -0.493* 
  
(0.284) 
 
(0.287) (0.288) 
Alternative 
compliance payment 
 
1.114* 
 
1.087* 1.061* 
  
(0.586) 
 
(0.586) (0.586) 
Alternative 
compliance payment 
rate 
 
-0.0226** 
 
-0.0224** -0.0220* 
  
(0.0114) 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) 
Control Variables      
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Waste in place 6.64e-08* 6.38e-08* 6.65e-08* 6.40e-08* 6.38e-08* 
 
(3.65e-08) (3.67e-08) (3.65e-08) (3.66e-08) (3.66e-08) 
Temperature -0.00237 -0.00233 -0.00237 -0.00231 -0.00230 
 
(0.00876) (0.00877) (0.00876) (0.00877) (0.00877) 
Precipitation 9.93e-07 9.11e-07 9.76e-07 8.94e-07 8.80e-07 
 
(1.93e-06) (1.94e-06) (1.93e-06) (1.94e-06) (1.94e-06) 
Interaction- waste & 
temperature 
-5.68e-10 -5.45e-10 -5.70e-10 -5.47e-10 -5.45e-10 
 
(4.87e-10) (4.88e-10) (4.87e-10) (4.88e-10) (4.88e-10) 
Interaction – waste & 
precipitation 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Landfill age 
0.0452*** 0.0457*** 0.0448*** 0.0453*** 0.0454*** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
Landfill age squared 
-
0.000737*** 
-
0.000748*** 
-
0.000731*** 
-
0.000740*** 
-
0.000742*** 
 
(0.000189) (0.000190) (0.000189) (0.000190) (0.000190) 
Distance to power 
grid 
-0.0440*** -0.0437*** -0.0439*** -0.0436*** -0.0436*** 
 
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
Public ownership 
-0.533*** -0.535*** -0.532*** -0.534*** -0.533*** 
 
(0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0965) (0.0965) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
State fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Individual fixed 
effect no no no no no 
Constant -7.520*** -6.968*** -7.512*** -6.995*** -6.948*** 
 
(1.269) (1.310) (1.270) (1.312) (1.301) 
Observations 27,318 27,318 27,318 27,318 27,318 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks indicate the significance levels of each coefficient estimation: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The waste, precipitation, and temperature data are not scaled in these models, 
unlike in the main model presented in chapter 5. The electricity price and gas price variables are the 3 year average 
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prices. The electricity price (non average) and gas price (non average) are the respective energy prices for individual 
year without averaging. The same is true for lagged electricity/gas price (non average). 
 
In Table A2, are the results of the linear probability models with year and landfill fixed effects. 
The models specifications are similar to that in Table A1., except that time-invariant individual 
landfill characteristics were dropped because they are included in the landfill fixed effects.  
The most significant difference in the linear probability model is that the RPS variable has a 
positive and significant effect on landfill energy project decisions – columns (1), (3), (4), and (5), 
especially when the ACP and PPA variables are included – columns (3), (4) and (5). Further, the 
lagged state grant variable was significant in all model specifications, even without the inclusion 
of the state grant dummy. 
However, natural gas price appears to have a negative effect on project development in all the 
specification. And the lagged PPA has a negative effect, which means if there was a power 
purchasing agreement available the year before, it is less likely that a LFGE project will be built. 
This is counterintuitive because the existence of a PPA in previous years should encourage 
project development. The ACP dummy and ACP rate variables are behaving counter-intuitively 
as in the logit models. Nevertheless, controlling for ACP and PPA variables seem to affect the 
coefficient of the RPS variable. 
 
 
Table A2. Linear probability models with different specifications 
 
Bench mark 
model 
specification 
Model with 
state grant 
Model with 
PPA & ACP 
Model with 
PPA, ACP & 
state grant 
Model with 
present & 
lagged 
energy prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Economic Variables      
７８ 
 
RPS 0.000519* 0.000500 0.000787** 0.000762** 0.000775** 
 
(0.000309) (0.000309) (0.000332) (0.000333) (0.000337) 
Electricity Price 0.00219 0.00236 0.000901 0.00108 
 
 
(0.00206) (0.00207) (0.00213) (0.00213) 
 Gas Price -0.00311** -0.00304** -0.00282* -0.00270* 
 
 
(0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00151) 
 Electricity price (non 
average) 
    
0.00219 
     
(0.00318) 
Gas price (non average) 
    
-0.00191 
     
(0.00117) 
Lagged electricity price 
    
-0.00174 
     
(0.00330) 
Lagged gas price 
    
0.00124 
     
(0.00135) 
State grant 
 
-0.00922 
 
-0.0109 -0.0108 
  
(0.00805) 
 
(0.00812) (0.00814) 
Lagged state grant 0.0246*** 0.0309*** 0.0270*** 0.0346*** 0.0347*** 
 
(0.00661) (0.00862) (0.00667) (0.00874) (0.00875) 
Investment tax credit 0.0117 0.0119 0.00904 0.00898 0.00798 
 
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
Production tax credit -0.00922 -0.00944 -0.00944 -0.00971 -0.0101 
 (0.00867) (0.00867) (0.00870) (0.00871) (0.00872) 
Power purchase 
agreement 
  
0.00158 0.00267 0.00341 
 
  
(0.00657) (0.00661) (0.00660) 
Lagged purchase 
agreement 
  
-0.0199** -0.0211*** -0.0227*** 
 
  
(0.00775) (0.00781) (0.00783) 
Alternative compliance 
payment 
  
-0.00138*** -0.00139*** -0.00139*** 
 
  
(0.000361) (0.000361) (0.000361) 
Alternative compliance 
payment rate 
  
0.0798*** 0.0799*** 0.0796*** 
 
  
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) 
７９ 
 
Control Variables      
Landfill age squared -1.39e-05* -1.34e-05* -1.29e-05 -1.23e-05 -1.23e-05 
 (7.92e-06) (7.93e-06) (7.97e-06) (7.98e-06) (7.98e-06) 
Landfill age 0.00657*** 0.00656*** 0.00644*** 0.00641*** 0.00593*** 
 
(0.000557) (0.000557) (0.000570) (0.000571) (0.000569) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual landfill fixed 
effect yes yes yes yes Yes 
Constant -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.115*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0174) 
Observations 27,318 27,318 27,318 27,318 27,318 
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Number of projects 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks indicate the significance levels of each coefficient estimation: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The electricity price and gas price variables are the 3 year average prices. The 
electricity price (non average) and gas price (non average) are the respective energy prices for individual year 
without averaging. The same is true for lagged electricity/gas price (non average). 
In the fixed effect linear probability model, the results for RPS, state grant, and landfill age were 
consistent with the theory. However, the effects of gas price, PPA, and ACP are counterintuitive. 
Comparing this with the logit model, there is a consensus that the gas price, landfill age, distance 
to grid, and public ownership has an effect on project decision. The other variables show mixed 
results depending on the model type and specification. 
The results of the random effect logit models are presented in Table A3. The landfill age, 
distance to power grid, public ownership variables are significant and the signs are as expected. 
The amount of waste is also significant in a 10% significance level. As in the logit model, the 
natural gas price is significant in all model specifications. Among the policy variables the lagged 
state grant is the only significant factor, especially when the state grant variable is included in the 
model. However, as mentioned earlier, this may be due to multi-collinearity. Further, the signs of 
the ACP dummy, ACP rate and lagged PPA behave counterintuitively as they did in the fixed 
effect linear probability model. 
８０ 
 
 
Table A3. Random Effect Logit models with different specifications. 
 
Benchmark 
model 
Model with 
state grant 
Model with 
PPA & ACP 
Model with 
PPA, ACP, and 
state grant 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic Variables     
RPS 0.0148 0.0139 0.0190 0.0177 
 
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Electricity price 0.141 0.155 0.0960 0.109 
 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.118) (0.118) 
Gas price 0.558*** 0.569*** 0.479*** 0.496*** 
 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.178) (0.177) 
State grant 
 
-0.493* 
 
-0.560* 
  
(0.295) 
 
(0.297) 
Lagged state grant 0.363 0.640** 0.435* 0.759** 
 
(0.257) (0.306) (0.263) (0.315) 
Investment tax credit 0.557 0.567 0.500 0.492 
 
(0.757) (0.754) (0.761) (0.759) 
Production tax credit 0.599 0.586 0.548 0.534 
 
(0.577) (0.576) (0.578) (0.578) 
Power purchase agreement 
  
0.116 0.207 
   
(0.254) (0.259) 
Lagged power purchase 
agreement 
  
-0.499 -0.590* 
   
(0.309) (0.313) 
Alternative Compliance 
Payment rate 
  
-0.0219* -0.0218* 
   
(0.0133) (0.0132) 
Alternative compliance 
payment dummy 
  
1.100 1.078 
   
(0.676) (0.674) 
Control Variables     
８１ 
 
Waste in place 1.23e-07* 1.22e-07* 1.25e-07* 1.24e-07* 
 
(7.36e-08) (7.29e-08) (7.39e-08) (7.35e-08) 
Temperature -0.00646 -0.00638 -0.00599 -0.00595 
 
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0143) 
Precipitation 5.98e-07 5.89e-07 4.78e-07 4.65e-07 
 
(3.19e-06) (3.16e-06) (3.19e-06) (3.17e-06) 
Interaction- waste & 
temperature 
-1.05e-09 -1.04e-09 -1.09e-09 -1.08e-09 
 
(9.62e-10) (9.53e-10) (9.64e-10) (9.58e-10) 
Interaction – waste & 
precipitation 
0 0 0 0 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) 
Landfill age 0.0779*** 0.0765*** 0.0782*** 0.0768*** 
 
(0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Landfill age squared -0.00116*** -0.00114*** -0.00117*** -0.00115*** 
 
(0.000331) (0.000328) (0.000332) (0.000332) 
Distance to power grid -0.0757*** -0.0747*** -0.0748** -0.0742** 
 
(0.0292) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
Public ownership -0.777*** -0.768*** -0.780*** -0.773*** 
 
(0.199) (0.197) (0.200) (0.199) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual landfill fixed 
effect yes yes yes yes 
Observations 27,318 27,318 27,318 27,318 
Number of landfills 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks indicate the significance levels of each coefficient estimation: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The waste, precipitation, and temperature data are not scaled in these models, 
unlike in the main model presented in chapter 5.  
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